Поппер — как правильно выбрать
If the new predictions are borne out, then the new theory is corroborated and the old one falsifiedand is adopted рейтинг рабочих воблеров a working hypothesis. If the predictions are not borne out, then they falsify the theory from which they are derived. Thus Popper retains an element of empiricism: But unlike traditional empiricists, Popper holds that experience cannot determine theory i. Moreover, Popper also rejects the empiricist doctrine that empirical observations are, or can be, infallible, in view of the fact that they are themselves theory-laden. Popper eliminates the contradiction by rejecting the first of these principles and removing the demand for empirical verification in favour of empirical falsification in the second. Scientific theories, for him, are not inductively inferred from experience, nor is scientific experimentation carried out with a view to verifying or finally establishing the truth of theories; rather, all knowledge is provisional, conjectural, hypothetical —we can never finally prove our scientific theories, we can merely provisionally confirm or conclusively refute them; hence at any given time we have to choose between the potentially infinite number of theories which will explain the set of phenomena under investigation. Faced with this choice, we can only eliminate those theories which are demonstrably false, and rationally choose between the remaining, unfalsified theories. For it is only by critical thought that we can eliminate false theories, and determine which of the remaining theories is the best available one, in the sense of possessing the highest level of explanatory force and predictive power. It is precisely this kind of critical thinking which is conspicuous by its absence in contemporary Marxism and in psychoanalysis. In the view of many social scientists, the more probable a theory is, the better it is, and if we have to choose between two theories which are equally strong in terms of their explanatory power, and differ only in that one is probable and the other is improbable, then we should choose the former. But if this is true, Popper argues, then, paradoxical as it may sound, the more improbable a theory is the better it is scientifically, because the probability and informative content of a theory vary inversely—the higher the informative content of a theory the lower will be its probability, for the more information a statement contains, the greater will be the number of ways in which it may turn out to be false.
Thus the statements which are of special interest to the scientist are those with a high informative content and consequentially a low probability, which nevertheless come close to the truth. Informative content, which is in inverse proportion to probability, is in direct proportion to testability. Consequently the severity of the test to which a theory can be subjected, and by means of which it is falsified or corroborated, is all-important. For Popper, all scientific criticism must be piecemeal, i. More precisely, while attempting to resolve a particular problem a scientist of necessity accepts all kinds of things as unproblematic. However, he stresses that the background knowledge is not knowledge in the sense of being conclusively established; it may be challenged at any time, especially if it is suspected that its uncritical acceptance may be responsible for difficulties which are subsequently encountered. Nevertheless, it is clearly not possible to question both the theory and the background knowledge at the same time e. How then can one be certain that one is questioning the right thing? The Popperian answer is that we cannot have absolute certainty here, but repeated tests usually show where the trouble lies. Even observation statements, Popper maintains, are fallible, and science in his view is not a quest for certain knowledge, but an evolutionary process in which hypotheses or conjectures are imaginatively proposed and tested in order to explain facts or to solve problems. Popper emphasises both the importance of questioning the background knowledge when the need arises, and the significance of the fact that observation-statements are theory-laden, and hence fallible. For while falsifiability is simple as a logical principle, in practice it is exceedingly complicated—no single observation can ever be taken to falsify a theory, for there is always the possibility a that the observation itself is mistaken, or b that the assumed background knowledge is faulty or defective. Popper was initially uneasy with the concept of truth, and in his earliest writings he avoided asserting that a theory which is corroborated is true—for clearly if every theory is an open-ended hypothesis, as he maintains, then ipso facto it has to be at least potentially false.
Popper offered two methods of comparing theories in terms of verisimilitude, the qualitative and quantitative definitions. On the qualitative account, Popper asserted:. Conjectures and Refutations Here, verisimilitude is defined in terms of subclass relationships: On the quantitative account, verisimilitude is defined by assigning quantities to contents, where the index of the content of a given theory is its logical improbability given again that content and probability vary inversely. Thus scientific progress involves, on this view, the abandonment of partially true, but falsified, theories, for theories with a higher level of verisimilitude, i. In this way, verisimilitude allowed Popper to mitigate what many saw as the pessimism of an anti-inductivist philosophy of science which held that most, if not all scientific theories are false, and that a true theory, even if discovered, could not be known to be such. With the introduction of the new concept, Popper was able to represent this as an essentially optimistic position in terms of which we can legitimately be said to have reason to believe that science makes progress towards the truth through the falsification and corroboration of theories. Scientific progress, in other words, could now be represented as progress towards the truth, and experimental corroboration could be seen an indicator of verisimilitude. In this connection, Popper had written:. Commentators on Popper, with few exceptions, had initially attached little importance to his theory of verisimilitude. However, it is worth emphasising that his angle of approach to these fields is through a consideration of the nature of the social sciences which seek to describe and explicate them systematically, particularly history. It is in this context that he offers an account of the nature of scientific prediction, which in turn allows him a point of departure for his attack upon totalitarianism and all its intellectual supports, especially holism and historicism. Historicism, which is closely associated with holism, is the belief that history develops inexorably and necessarily according to certain principles or rules towards a determinate end as for example in the dialectic of Hegel, which was adopted and implemented by Marx.
The link between holism and historicism is that the holist believes that individuals are essentially formed by the social groupings to which they belong, while the historicist—who is usually also a holist—holds that we can understand such a social grouping only in terms of the internal principles which determine its development. Popper thinks that this view of the social sciences is both theoretically misconceived in the sense of being based upon a view of natural science and its methodology which is totally wrongand socially dangerous, as it leads inevitably to totalitarianism and authoritarianism—to centralised governmental control of the individual and the attempted imposition of large-scale social planning. Поппер же считал, что таких законов нет он был историческим индетерминистома общество формируется не этими законами, а суммой действий всех индивидов. Поппер утверждал, что поскольку процесс накопления человеческого знания непредсказуем, то теории идеального государственного управления принципиально не существует, следовательно, политическая система должна быть достаточно гибкой, чтобы правительство могло плавно менять свою политику. В силу этого общество должно быть открыто для множества точек зрения и культурто есть обладать признаками плюрализма и мультикультурализма  . Реформы, согласно Попперу, должны проводиться пошагово, для решения конкретных проблем и своевременно корректироваться в зависимости от результата их применения. Эту методологию, которую Поппер назвал социальной инженерией противопоставляя её социальному прожектёрствуиспользовали многие европейские страны для проведения своих реформ во 2-й половине XX века  . Ряд учёных, не согласных с идеями Поппера, попытались доказать тот факт, что принцип фальсифицируемости не может быть основной методологической единицей при обсуждении вопросов подтверждения, проверки и опровержения теорий. Кун отмечает, что для выбора между конкурирующими научными теориями одной лишь опытной проверки недостаточно. Кроме опыта, важными компонентами научного творчества являются интуиция, психология и философские соображения. Эталон для построения научной теории называется парадигмой. Смысл научных революций заключается не в смене одной фундаментальной теории другой под влиянием новых фактов, а в смене научных парадигм . Бунге отвергает постпозитивистскую философию на основе следующих аргументов: Одной лишь эмпирической проверки научной теории недостаточно. Кроме эмпирической проверки, необходима метатеоретическая проверка внутренняя логическая непротиворечивость, наличие следствий, наличие процедуры перехода от ненаблюдаемых к наблюдаемыминтертеоретическая проверка согласованность теории с другими теориями, уже получившими признаниефилософская проверка соответствие теории определённой философии . Впервые очное столкновение между Поппером и неомарксистами произошло в году.
Речь шла о применимости попперовских критериев к гуманитарным наукам. Однако идеи отказа исследовать целую картину мира и общество в частности, предложенные Поппером, критиковались и в более ранних трудах представителей Франкфуртской школы.
На такие приманки рыба чаще всего клюет, так как они вызывают меньше подозрения. В воде рыбе лучше виден поппер, что позволяет ей прицелиться и заглотнуть. Их широко используют для поиска месторасположения хищников. Такие приманки чаще всего используют в заросших водоемах, где поверхность плотно закрыта водорослями. Они легко проходят сквозь заросли, не цепляя. Зачастую в таких водоемах водится щука. Если поппер все-таки цепляет водоросли, то помочь в решении этой проблемы смогут помочь усики, которые можно легко создать из проволоки. Поппер в качестве приманки на хищника лучше всего использовать летом — осенью. Именно в этот период начинается цветенье подводных водорослей.
Такой цвет мальки используют в качестве укрытия от хищников. Когда цвет начинает опускаться на дно, эффективность такой приманки стремительно падает. Лучше всего рыбачить на поппер в конце дня. Профессиональные рыбаки отмечают, что чаще всего рыба начинает клевать за полтора часа до захода солнца. Жор продолжается до полного потемнения.
Конечно, ловить на такую приманку можно и в темное время, но это будет очень затруднительно. В темноте будет сложно уследить за поведением приманки. Также поппер может стать полезным при утренней рыбалке. If they are not open to falsification they can not be scientific. If they are not scientific, it needs to be explained how they can be informative about real world objects and events. In one sense it is irrefutable and logically truein the second sense it is factually true and falsifiable. Popper considered historicism to be the theory that history develops inexorably and necessarily according to knowable general laws towards a determinate end. He argued that this view is the principal theoretical presupposition underpinning most forms of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. He argued that historicism is founded upon mistaken assumptions regarding the nature of scientific law and prediction. Since the growth of human knowledge is a causal factor in the evolution of human history, and since "no society can predict, scientifically, its own future states of knowledge",  it follows, he argued, that there can be no predictive science of human history. For Popper, metaphysical and historical indeterminism go hand in hand. In his early years Popper was impressed by Marxism, whether of Communists or socialists. An event that happened in had a profound effect on him: However, he knew that the riot instigators were swayed by the Marxist doctrine that class struggle would produce vastly more dead men than the inevitable revolution brought about as quickly as possible, and so had no scruples to put the life of the rioters at risk to achieve their selfish goal of becoming the future leaders of the working class. This was the start of his later criticism of historicism. Specifically, he unsuccessfully recommended that socialists should be invited to participate, and that emphasis should be put on a hierarchy of humanitarian values rather than advocacy of a free market as envisioned by classical liberalism. Although Popper was an advocate of toleration, he said that intolerance should not be tolerated, for if tolerance allowed intolerance to succeed completely, tolerance would be threatened.
Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies ; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be most unwise.
Karl Popper: Philosophy of Science
But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all argument; they may forbid their followers to listen to rational argument, because it is deceptive, and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists or pistols. We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. We should claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law, and we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, in the same way as we should consider incitement to murder, or to kidnapping, or to the revival of the slave trade, as criminal. As early asPopper wrote of the search for truth as "one of the strongest motives for scientific discovery. Then came the semantic theory of truth formulated by the logician Alfred Tarski and published in The theory met critical objections to truth as correspondence and thereby rehabilitated it. According to this theory, the conditions for the truth of a sentence as well as the sentences themselves are part of a metalanguage. So, for example, the sentence "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. He bases this interpretation on the fact that examples such as the one described above refer to two things: The first case belongs to the metalanguage whereas the second is more likely to belong to the object language. Hence, "it is true that" possesses the logical status of a redundancy. Upon this basis, along with that of the logical content of assertions where logical content is inversely proportional to probabilityPopper went on to develop his important notion of verisimilitude or "truthlikeness". The intuitive idea behind verisimilitude is that the assertions or hypotheses of scientific theories can be objectively measured with respect to the amount of truth and falsity that they imply. And, in this way, one theory can be evaluated as more or less true than another on a quantitative basis which, Popper emphasises forcefully, has nothing to do with "subjective probabilities" or other merely "epistemic" considerations. The simplest mathematical formulation that Popper gives of this concept can be found in the tenth chapter of Conjectures and Refutations.
Here he defines it as:. However, it inspired a wealth of new attempts. Knowledge, for Popper, was objective, both in the sense that it is objectively true or truthlikeand also in the sense that knowledge has an ontological status i. An Evolutionary Approach He proposed three worlds: World Three, he argued, was the product of individual human beings in exactly the same sense that an animal path is the product of individual animals, and that, as such, has an existence and evolution independent of any individual knowing subjects. The influence of World Three, in his view, on the individual human mind World Two is at least as strong as the influence of World One. In other words, the knowledge held by a given individual mind owes at least as much to the total accumulated wealth of human knowledge, made manifest, as to the world of direct experience. As such, the growth of human knowledge could be said to be a function of the independent evolution of World Three. The creation—evolution controversy in the United States raises the issue of whether creationistic ideas may be legitimately called science and whether evolution itself may be legitimately called science. In this context, passages written by Popper are frequently quoted in which he speaks about such issues himself. For example, he famously stated " Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research program—a possible framework for testable scientific theories. And yet, the theory is invaluable. I do not see how, without it, our knowledge could have grown as it has done since Darwin. In trying to explain experiments with bacteria which become adapted to, say, penicillinit is quite clear that we are greatly helped by the theory of natural selection. Although it is metaphysical, it sheds much light upon very concrete and very practical researches. It allows us to study adaptation to a new environment such as a penicillin-infested environment in a rational way: He also noted that theismpresented as explaining adaptation, "was worse than an open admission of failure, for it created the impression that an ultimate explanation had been reached". This is an immensely impressive and powerful theory.
The claim that it completely explains evolution is of course a bold claim, and very far from being established. All scientific theories are conjectures, even those that have successfully passed many severe and varied tests. The Mendelian underpinning of modern Darwinism has been well tested, and so has the theory of evolution which says that all terrestrial life has evolved from a few primitive unicellular organisms, possibly even from one single organism. What makes the origin of life and of the genetic code a disturbing riddle is this: But, as Monod points out, the machinery by which the cell at least the non-primitive cell, which is the only one we know translates the code "consists of at least fifty macromolecular components which are themselves coded in the DNA ". Monod, ; . Thus the code can not be translated except by using certain products of its translation. This constitutes a really baffling circle; a vicious circle, it seems, for any attempt to form a model, or theory, of the genesis of the genetic code. Thus we may be faced with the possibility that the origin of life like the origin of the universe becomes an impenetrable barrier to science, and a residue to all attempts to reduce biology to chemistry and physics. He explained that the difficulty of testing had led some people to describe natural selection as a tautologyand that he too had in the past described the theory as "almost tautological", and had tried to explain how the theory could be untestable as is a tautology and yet of great scientific interest:. My solution was that the doctrine of natural selection is a most successful metaphysical research programme. It raises detailed problems in many fields, and it tells us what we would expect of an acceptable solution of these problems. If the experimental setup, however, is expanded to include the results of our looking at the penny, and thus includes the outcome of the experiment itself, then the probability will be either 0 or 1. This does not, though, involve positing any collapse of the wave-function caused merely by the act of human observation.
Instead, what has occurred is simply a change in the experimental setup. Once we include the measurement result in our setup, the probability of a particular outcome will trivially become 0 or 1. This picture becomes somewhat more complicated, however, when we consider methodology in social sciences such as sociology and economics, where experimentation plays a much less central role.
This stands in stark contrast to disciplines such as physics, where the formulation and testing of laws plays a central role in making progress. If the relevant theories are falsified, scientists can easily respond, for instance, by changing one or more auxiliary hypotheses, and then conducting additional experiments on the new, slightly modified theory. By contrast, a law that purports to describe the future progress of history in its entirety cannot easily be tested in this way. Even if a particular prediction about the occurrence of some particular event is incorrect, there is no way of altering the theory to retest it—each historical event only occurs one, thus ruling out the possibility of carrying more tests regarding this event. Popper also rejects the claim that it is possible to formulate and test laws of more limited scope, such as those that purport to describe an evolutionary process that occurs in multiple societies, or that attempt to capture a trend within a given society. This impossibility is because of the holism of utopian plans, which involve changing everything at the same time. This lack of testability, in turn, means that there is no way for the utopian engineers to improve their plans. In place of historicism and utopian holism, Popper argues that the social sciences should embrace both methodological individualism and situational analysis.
Scientific hypotheses about the behavior of such unplanned institutions, then, must be formulated in terms of the constituent participants. For both Popper and Hayek, the defense of methodological individualism within the social sciences plays a key role in their broader argument in favor of liberal, market economies and against planned economies. While Popper endorses methodological individualism, he rejects the doctrine of psychologismaccording to which laws about social institutions must be reduced to psychological laws concerning the behavior of individuals. Popper objects to this view, which he associates with John Stuart Mill, on the grounds that it ends up collapsing into a form of historicism. The argument can be summarized as follows: In order to eliminate the reference to the particular social institutions that make up this environment, we are then forced to demonstrate how these institutions were themselves a product of individual motives that had operated within some other previously existing social environment. This, though, quickly leads to an unsustainable regress, since humans always act within particular social environments, and their motives cannot be understood without reference to these environments. The only way out for the advocate of psychologism is to posit that both the origin and evolution of all human institutions can be explained purely in terms of human psychology. Popper argues that there is no historical support for the idea that there was ever such as an origin of social institutions. He also argues that this is a form of historicism, insofar as it commits us to discovering laws governing the evolution of society as a whole. As such, it inherits all of the problems mentioned previously. In place of psychologism, Popper endorses a version of methodological individualism based on situational analysis. On this method, we begin by creating abstract models of the social institutions that we wish to investigate, such as markets or political institutions. In keeping with methodological individualism, these models will contain, among other things, representations of individual agents. However, instead of stipulating that these agents will behave according to the laws governing individual human psychology, as psychologism does, we animate the model by assuming that the agents will respond appropriately according to the logic of the situation. Popper calls this constraint on model building within the social sciences the rationality principle. Popper recognizes that both the rationality principle and the models built on the basis of it are empirically false—after all, real humans often respond to situations in ways that are irrational and inappropriate.
Popper also rejects, however, the idea that the rationality principle should be thought of as a methodological principle that is a priori immune to testing, since part of what makes theories in the social sciences testable is the fact that they make definite claims about individual human behavior. Instead, Popper defends the use of the rationality principle in model building on the grounds that is generally good policy to avoid blaming the falsification of a model on the inaccuracies introduced by the rationality principle and that we can learn more if we blame the other assumptions of our situational analysisp. More importantly, holding the rationality principle fixed makes it much easier for us to formulate crucial tests of rival theories and to make genuine progress in the social sciences. By contrast, if the rationality principle were relaxed, he argues, there would be almost no substantive constraints on model building. As mentioned earlier, Popper was one of the most important critics of the early logical empiricist program, and the criticisms he leveled against helped shape the future work of both the logical empiricists and their critics. In addition, while his falsification-based approach to scientific methodology is no longer widely accepted within philosophy of science, it played a key role in laying the ground for later work in the field, including that of Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend, as well as contemporary Bayesianism. It also plausible that the widespread popularity of falsificationism—both within and outside of the scientific community—has had an important role in reinforcing the image of science as an essentially empirical activity and in highlighting the ways in which genuine scientific work differs from so-called pseudoscience. Philosophy of Science Karl Popper was one of the most influential philosophers of science of the 20th century. Background Popper began his academic studies at the University of Vienna inand he focused on both mathematics and theoretical physics. We might roughly summarize the theories as follows: Auxiliary and Ad Hoc Hypotheses While Popper consistently defends a falsification-based solution to the problem of demarcation throughout his published work, his own explications of it include a number of qualifications to ensure a better fit with the realities of scientific practice. Popper concludes that, while Marxism had originally been a scientific theory: Basic Sentences and the Role of Convention A second complication for the simple theory of falsification just described concerns the character of the observations that count as potential falsifiers of a theory. The basic idea is as follows: For a given statement Hlet the content of H be the class of all of the logical consequences of So, if H is true, then all of the members of this class would be true; if H were false however, then only some members of this class would be true, since every false statement has at least some true consequences.
The content of H can be broken into two parts: Popper on scrolling container In this example we have a relative div which contains a div with overflow: Shifted popper on start. Shifted popper on end. Shifted poppers Shift your poppers on start or end of its reference element side. Pop on the bottom. Popper on bottom Flips when hits viewport.